Published in Maska,Performing Arts Journal vol. XXIV, no. 120-121, Spring 2009
ÒIn Search of LiberationÓ
Rozalinda Borcila
From the perspective of capital,
some parts of the world are backwards and must be taught the lessons of market
democracy. But this narrative of Òlagging behindÓ can also be reinforced from
the perspective of a counter-capitalism that privileges specific histories and
discourses: if you want to recognize yourself as producing critique, you need
to Òcatch upÓ on the bibliography and lingo. I think this asynchronicity is internalized in the Romanian
geographic imaginary. It works to capture and evacuate what arises in moments
of becoming – the energy produced when we experience our shared capacity
to transform our world.
In 1969, Shell Oil began
elaborating what it called ÒGlobal Scenarios for the FutureÓ,
a method of storytelling intended Òto rediscover the original
entrepreneurial power of foresight in contexts of change, complexity, and
uncertaintyÓ[1].
ShellÕs method, developed by scenario guru Pierre Wack, is largely credited for
the success of Shell Oil in the 1990s, and has become the basis of corporate
futurology today. Wack insists his method is not about forecasting, but rather
about visualization: about allowing decision-makers to Òre-perceive
realityÓ, Òdiscovering strategic options of
which you were previously unawareÓ[2] in
times of change or instability, which are also times for entrepreneurial
initiative and profit maximization.
I became interested in corporate
futurology when I stumbled upon ShellÕs scenario written in 1991 and made
public in 1992. This was the first set of narratives composed after the fall of
the Berlin wall, which visualized the world of 2020. Having declared the final
planetary victory of Òfree marketÓ capitalism, Shell futurologists imagined
that market liberalization (conflated with political liberalization) was an
unstoppable driving force, what Wack termed tendance
lourde. The question asked of the future was: what other forces would
develop in conjunction with, and in response to, market liberalization? How
would the instabilities and changes produced by these forces create
opportunities for profit maximization – or, how can one develop
strategies for action today in order to anticipate and redirect such forces
towards profit maximization??
A careful reading of the
scenarios of the subsequent sixteen years affords a different understanding of
by-now familiar practices of neoliberal planetary governance. In some cases
they require the use of direct coercive force: identifying or creating a
vacuum, a space in which some kind of governing structure has faltered
(crisis/catastrophe, economic implosion, political instability) and various
forms of Òdemographic manipulationÓ (relocations, displacements, regime
changes, etc). Although the ability to deploy coercive violence underscores the
narratives, scenarios focus more extensively on the arrangement of social
conditions to incentivize and mobilize entrepreneurial Òself-interestÓ. This
includes social development programs, the rapid, large-scale disbursement of
funds and massive resource allocation as ways to reform populations, constructing
societies free of Òdelinquent elementsÓ, changing worldviews, experience
management.
TINA scenarios continue to be
successful at helping their clients Òto imagine a future that is worth creating
– and reap the competitive advantages of preparing for it and making it
happenÓ[5].
They influence energy markets and policymaking, futures markets and Pentagon
war strategies. This success, we are told, is a demonstration of TINAÕs
inevitability. But I came to understand TINA as something else – as part
of a mythmaking project, which puts itself into circulation in order to make itself come true. TINA is a process: it is how the fantasy
of the global elites becomes reality. It is how the world is collapsed into a
single historical queue: how the simultaneous coexistence of different ways of
life, political visions and economic/social processes is reorganized as the
conditions of profit maximization for those who are farther ahead in the queue.
I was eighteen during the
Romanian revolution, and I remember the feeling – joyous and terrifying
– that anything was possible and nothing was scripted. In December 1989,
popular revolts spread throughout the country in a matter of days –
occupying police headquarters, main administrative buildings, media outlets and
the streets. Our escape was swift – but it was also in advance of any
meaningful political process, any real critique, any form of collectively
imagining or experimenting with alternative visions.
On
22 December, as Ceausescu fled Bucharest, different groups were forming within
the occupied government headquarters. They met on different floors of
a building under siege, each rushing to lay out the
management of the power vacuum and the political platform of the new regime. As
they self-inaugurated, proclamations succeeded each other throughout the
evening; decrees, political platforms, governing structures. By morning one
such group had become dominant. Resulting from the organizational and
networking savvy of a small group of former political aparatciks-turned-rebels, military commanders, media
managers and intellectuals – the FSN (National Salvation Front)
proclaimed itself the provisional, ÒapoliticalÓ governing structure whose role
would be to manage the power vacuum and organize the first free elections.
Within 24 hours the FSN began
operating at the national level, often using the organizational networks of
former institutions. The countryÕs best known political dissidents, whose
presence in front of the television cameras had proclaimed the victory of the
revolution, were at first the image but not the decision-makers of this
formation. As they gradually distanced themselves over the next weeks,
uneasiness grew about the totalizing rhetoric of the FSN. Small, local protests
turned to more directed outrage in February 1990, when the Front announced its
participation in the upcoming April elections. In the run up to the elections, the ÒoppositionÓ was formed by a
growing number of ÒhistoricalÓ parties, whose commitments to privatization,
liberalization, and ÒWesternizationÓ made them largely ideologically
indistinguishable from the FSN or from each other[6].
By early 1990, the December
Revolution became referred to as Òthe eventsÓ and later as Òwhatever happened,
happenedÓ. Public discourse quickly adopted the logic of transition, according
to which there were only two horizons: communism/the past (meaning totalitarian
dictatorship as represented by the previous Romanian regime and the Soviet
Union) or democracy/the future (meaning whatever type of market capitalism had
made Americans so wealthy and happy and functional).
From here on, any familiar or emerging social problems – from new forms
of dispossession and exclusion, to escalating ethnic violence, to epidemic
suicide rates – were paradoxically cast as symptoms of being
insufficiently capitalist, being still too far behind in the transition. Any
form of critique or resistance to the new regime reproduced, and to a large
extent continues to reproduce, the same narrative. And because we were to see
ourselves as being in someone elseÕs past, it remained difficult to recognize
the power differentials being produced in the present.
The period between January and
June 1990 is not as well known as the hyper visible televised revolution of the
previous December and – although coverage has been extensive in the
Romanian media – I fear it has not been sufficiently critically
processed.
The most debated phenomenon of
the period began in February 1990, as a convergence of hundreds of protests
against the FSN and its leader in the University Square in Bucharest. After two
months of off-and-on actions, the square was the site of a massive, continuous 40 day occupation ending in a two-day bloody repression.
Criminalized before 1994-1996, and heroicized since, the occupation is always understood as Òanti-communistÓ
and Òpro-WesternizationÓ. It began, so the story goes, in April: tens of
thousands cheered as a giant banner was hung in the University Square,
declaring it a Òspace liberated of neo-communismÓ. Protesters accused the
leader of the FSN of being too entrenched in soviet-style politics to
successfully lead the country towards American-style democracy. ItÕs catchy,
and it rhymes: ÒCine-a stat cinci ani la
rusi//Nu poate g”ndi ca BushÓ. (ÒOne who spent 5 years in Russia, cannot
think like Bush.Ó) Ten or twenty banners and slogans created during this time
came to represent the entire process of the occupation in the media and –
to my surprise – even in the subsequent testimonials of certain
participants. This reduction produced a totalizing and overly simplistic
understanding of the occupation within the narrative of capitalism as the only
alternative, and it reinforced a continuing identification of the previous
totalitarian regime as ÒcommunismÓ.[7]
I think there is another way to
look at the production of public speech through hundreds of image/texts
(inscriptions, markings, drawings, banners, signs, graffiti, songs, slogans)
during the 40-day occupation and to challenge this understanding in two
important ways. Firstly, this
production was continuous and at all different scales: on buildings, people,
balconies, papers. There was constant writing, rewriting, overwriting. As a material process, it had to do
with reclaiming and recombining architectural surfaces, found materials and
debris, domestic objects, food and bodies – and with producing different
constellations of writers, sign-makers and bearers, new collectivities of
speakers constituted across violently inscribed ethnic and class lines. During
the occupation, space was experienced as open, as a process that was never
finished. Secondly, image/texts did not emerge from an agreed-upon political
position or shared history of critique, but rather were the medium through which
different, often contradictory interpretations and positions confronted each
other. They reflected hundreds of speeches, meetings and debates, resolutions,
declarations and proclamations, and as many experiments in collective
decision-making and debate. In this sense, the occupation claimed space as
radically heterogeneous, as the dimension of the simultaneous coexistence of
difference.
I want to suggest that the
occupation can be seen the process of producing the future as open, as under construction[8].
In this way, the occupation as a political process was a way of thinking
beyond the narrative of capitalism as the only alternative. In the absence of
an established critical tradition, protest became the way to attend to the
spatial and social expressions of power, and to open up a search for critical
counter-narratives. It would entail the sustained collective attempt to learn
about social reality by radically reconfiguring it. Instead of reducing the entire phenomenon to
a handful of slogans, we can look to their production and transformation as
evidence of a continuously shifting conception and experience of power.
For instance, many other banners
naming the occupied space appeared alongside the dominant Òspace liberated of
neo-communismÓ. ÒIn search of liberationÓ suggests an understanding of the
occupation as a political experiment in opposition to the logic of transition
and normalization: a self-critical suspension of previously held assumptions
about what liberation means, from what and towards what, an interruption of the
logic of transition. The Square also became labeled as Òkilometer zeroÓ, suggesting a kind of
recalibration, a rebooting. This had been the site of some of the most intense
street protests the previous winter, so in a sense the occupation was a return
to Òmoment zeroÓ, the moment when opening, a way out, was forcefully produced,
and pushing back against closure. But there was also a
reconsideration or rereading of the revolutionary moment, and the
possibility of a reorientation: from the simple Òdown with communismÓ which
formed the platform of December 1989, towards a collectively formulated
alternative. After several failed and highly mediated attempts to
instrumentalize the occupation by the newly-formed
opposition parties, the occupants declare ÒWe are not political parties, we are
outlawsÓ. This points to the emergence of a more extensive critique of power as
it is produced and expressed through the forms of electoral politics. ÒNothing
is lost, everything mutatesÓ, a reconstitution of the former elite via the new
(or rebranded) institutions of the state, operating under a new set of signs:
privatization, democratization, Westernization[9].
A refusal to recognize the FSN drafted electoral law, and later the results of
the election, further suggests a reading of the occupation as a kind of
desertion that is not necessarily territory-bound, but a ÒÔfounding
leave-takingÕ that inaugurates a realm of common affairs at the same moment it
breaks from an established realmÓ[10].
I have found that working with
the history of corporate scenarios – especially with past futures from
the early 1990s – has been a way for me to make some sense of my
experiences of revolution, to look for what has not been exhausted or vacuated
by its failure. This remains to my mind an urgent task, and an increasingly
tricky one given the ways in which capitalism makes use of culture;
specifically, in the last ten or so years, the marketability of ÒsocialÓ and
ÒparticipatoryÓ art practices (and of artists such as myself who are
increasingly mobilized in the circuits of capital).
A critical position would have to
consider not only how tropes of collaboration and participation function to
turn collectively generated value into privately appropriated
(cultural/institutional/social) capital, but also how art operates to structure
social relations into specific forms of ÒcommunityÓ – to ÒpracticeÓ or
rehearse a specific set of Òsocial abilitiesÓ, which can be incentivized as a
strategic asset for profit maximization.
To a certain extent my work as an
artist begins from the premise that our available functional repertoire is
expandable – that there is a certain plasticity to our social
functionality, that we can learn to develop new Òsocial abilitiesÓ conducive to
a radical politics. In my work with the artist collective BLW[11]
(with Sarah Lewison and Julie Wyman), for instance, we envisioned the
collective as a body in need of ÒpracticeÓ, whose abilities were impaired by
our limited experience within neoliberal capitalism (and we took this to be
quite literally abilities to visualize, to see, to speak, or to otherwise act,
to form relationships or affiliations that were not determined and limited by
our relation to capital). I think we understood this as a spatial process, so
our work developed as workshops or public meetings. We would look for how (art)
ÒpracticeÓ could extend our collective capacities for a kind of escape, or at
the very least for resisting capture.
At times we worked explicitly
with the question of the future. In 2006 we produced a social performance (of
sorts) at the invitation of the exhibition Locally Localized Gravity organized
by the Institute of Contemporary Art in Philadelphia. We collaborated with the
Think Tank that has yet to be named, a local artist/activist collective
excluded from the exhibition, to initiate the Coalition of Inquiry into the
State of the Future. Beginning from our shared critique of the ways in which
this specific curatorial project framed Òsocial,
participatory, communalÓ art as a quasi-entrepreneurial practice (linked, for
instance, with real estate speculation), we imagined a coalition
as a social learning and practicing of something like Òcommunal justiceÓ. The
coalition self-inaugurated via activist and indymedia networks as a possibly
quasi-juridical body for investigating Òthe futureÓ as a mythmaking project
– the global future but also, specifically, the future as produced
through various public/private initiatives in the city of Philadelphia. These
included campaigns that legitimized themselves through Òcommunity involvementÓ,
including the Microsoft School of the Future, the Next Great City initiative,
The Great Expectations Program and the exhibition into which we were trying to
insert the public meeting as a spatial interruption[12].
The investigative process
involved submitting documents into evidence, soliciting Òexpert testimonyÓ from
residents, labor and community organizers, journalists, and artists, meeting
with self-appointed investigators-at-large and witnesses. The future was
summoned to a public hearing, where we deliberated whether there was evidence
of harm, as well as the nature and extent of the harm it might have
administered. (We wondered what
kind of collective body could indict the future and seek restorative measures).
Our deliberations suggested a
number of possible understandings of such harm. We accused that the future was
being produced through language that misrepresented Òthe transparent and participatory
nature of certain institutions and current and future initiatives associated
with the city of PhiladelphiaÓ as well as, Òthe nature of democracy and of the
democratic processÓ itself. The future demanded a specific kind of civic
engagement, which Òworks to disable participatory democracy, or to work against
civic education, or to actively create stupidityÓ. The most damaging accusation
was that of Òpre-empting the possibility of alternative futuresÓ.
Our stay in Philadelphia ended
before we could take on the question of ÒrestorationÓ and find ways to sustain
the process beyond the duration of the exhibit. This limitation is structural
in the trope of the Òart projectÓ, but my sense is that it did not fully
capture and spend the energies produced. Some of the media activists involved
in the deliberations recently made use of the experiment to re-imagine and
reframe their work; BLW continued to instigate public meetings in the most
policed open-air space in Chicago. A full understanding of what we might have
learned, what shared capacities we may have produced or uncovered, remains
elusive because it is not measurable in results. But something remains open,
remains in motion, and it pushes to dissolve art practice into a more
generalized social process of oppositional learning.
[1] Wack, Pierre. Scenarios:
Shooting the Rapids. Harvard Business Review,
November-December 1985. p. 14
[2] Ibid., p. 9
[4] In times of
uncertainty, the value of a future barrel of oil can surpass
its current pricing, which means there are greater opportunities for profit in
oil futures – thus (social and market) volatility is often a product of
speculative activity on oil futures. Anna Zalik has published several in-depth
studies on Shell scenarios, oil futures and the commodification of violence in
the Niger Delta.
[6] These are
the conditions for the emergence and continued popularity of the
ultra-nationalist party PRM, whose rallying cry ÒOur country is not for saleÓ
is a reactive reassertion of local identity on the basis of longstanding ethnic
and racial violence.
[7]
ÒPost-communismÓ as a critical discourse produced largely within the former
ÒWestÓ only goes to reinforce this problematic identification. I think we often
underestimate the extent to which specific language remains affectively associated with totalitarian violence
(communism, comrade, activist, collectivize, cooperate). Its coercive
repetition functions to foreclose the possibilities for critique or dissent in
the present.
[8] I am
relying heavily on Doreen MasseyÕs relational conceptualization of space as
Òthe sphere of coexisting heterogeneityÓ. Her work calls
for a politics that does not evade or tame the challenge of spatiality, does
not translate coexisting difference into different positions in a historical
sequence. Furthermore, attending
to space as Òunder constructionÓ and Ònever finishedÓ allows us to be sensitive
to the genuine openness of the future. For Space. London: Sage
2005.
[10] Zach
Bratich on VirnoÕs notion of exit. His provocative essay rethinks the
possibilities of secession as an exit that is not land-oriented – and
re-imagines secession away from the breaking of a solid and towards the
dynamics of fluids. ÒSwarmcession!Ó Lumpen
Magazine #96 (July 2005) pp. 20-25.
[11] BLW produce
situations for engaged speaking and exchange; these include workshops and
meetings in public spaces, as well as re-speakings of video recordings from the
histories of radical social movements in the US. BLW is Rozalinda Borcila,
Sarah Lewison and Julie Wyman.
[12] More
information on the investigation can be found at http://www.carbonfarm.us/blw/